Thursday, December 6, 2007

Ambiguous Beauty...Virtuous Justice

The Republic, Plato’s most prominent work, centers itself around both Socrates’ creation of an ideal city and the political turmoil and drama of Glaucon. These two central aspects of this ancient philosophical text are intertwined throughout the ten books chronicling the speeches of Socrates, and are designed to eventually give a description of justice within a society. However, as the perfect city comes into hypothetical existence, Socrates finds himself having to explain the concept of beauty to the confused Glaucon. Often placing the varied definitions of justice next to the different standards of beauty, Socrates is hoping to convince Glaucon that when beauty becomes the focus of a city, justice, the virtue designed to maintain a city, is often overlooked and thrown to the wayside.

Early on in the dialogues, Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus engage in a conversation concerning justice and injustice in regards to a man. Glaucon poses a scenario involving a ring that makes the wearer invisible. The man in possession of this ring has, in essence, the power to do whatever he wants. The question is, if both a just and unjust man were to each be given a ring of this nature, would the just man remain just? If given the chance to do unjust things – steal, release prisoners, have intercourse with any woman at any time – is a just man likely to remain as honorable and just as he would if such a ring were not with him (360b3-c7)? Socrates argues that no, the just man would become an unjust man, at least when he had the ring, simply because no one would know what he was doing. He would still have the reputation of a just man, but be benefiting from the spoils of unjust deeds.
This discourse on the ring leads into Socrates’ presentation of how to test a man’s true character. Two men will be studied, one just, the other unjust. The unjust man will earn a reputation as a just man. His unjust pursuits will be completely disregarded and he will be viewed and respected as a man with the utmost qualities of justice. The just man, however, will be seen as an unjust man. Despite his esteemed efforts in, “doing no injustice, let him have the greatest reputation for injustice, so that his justice may be put to the test to see if it is softened by bad reputation and its consequences,” (361c4-6.) At the end of his life, each man looks back, reflecting on the things he has done. The unjust man is satisfied with the life he has led. He has done the things unjust men do, but has been regarded as a just man. The just man reflects and realizes that he would’ve been better served had he been unjust, because then he would have earned the reputation of a just man – the reputation he truly deserved. Socrates, in describing the reputations and lives of these two men, is presenting the concept of justice falling prey to injustice. When presented with which to pursue, either justice or injustice, this argument claims that to be unjust would better serve one’s personal wants and needs. This is the first time Socrates presents the concept of injustice being attractive, and this will prove essential in the argument to follow, simply because the attractive – the beautiful - things in life are the easiest to access and participate in.


Therefore, if injustice is beautiful, it is easier to be attracted to the unjust way of life, which Socrates is trying to pull Glaucon away from.
As the conversation between Glaucon and Socrates continues, they begin to discuss the actual city they want to create. Glaucon, as the reader will learn, is overly concerned about luxurious things in his city. Upon noticing this obsession with fine things Socrates launches into a comparison between healthy and feverish cities. He claims that in the feverish city, “nothing stands in the way,” meaning, that what anyone wants, anyone gets (372e6.) The feverish city is Glaucon’s “luxurious city,” a city filled with people “concerned with figures and colors…” (373b4.) Plato is presenting us with a character drawn to the glamorous spoils of the world in the form of Glaucon. Socrates knows that Glaucon enjoys beautiful things, and because injustice is beautiful, Glaucon would be pulled to a life of injustice. Therefore, Socrates must convince Glaucon that if a city is overcome with beautiful things then the city will not be the perfect city they are striving for. In essence, Socrates must make the beautiful appear unattractive. Once again, it is seen that beauty and justice rub together; Socrates cannot persuade Glaucon into a just way of life when injustice is beautiful. If Socrates is unsuccessful in his argument, injustice will prevail over justice within their city in the form of beautiful things.


In order to provide greater stability within his argument, Socrates begins to discuss the forms of the soul. Presenting the qualities of moderation, courage, liberality, and magnificence, Socrates claims that a musical man notices the people who have these qualities within their soul, and that when these dispositions are joined together it is “the fairest sight for him who is able to see” (402d2.) And, because Socrates needs further clout in the debate, “the fairest is the most lovable” (402d5.) Quite simply, the musical man – the man with a harmonious nature – loves the man whose soul is in order. This musical man, this being in possession of internal harmony, can appreciate and understand beauty. He does not see beauty on a physical level; instead, he appreciates the beauty within, the beauty that comes from a soul connected with the forms. This is the type of beauty Socrates is advocating, and on some level, Glaucon already appreciates this beauty. Socrates must tread lightly, however, because the fact still remains that the beautiful things, internal or external, are easiest to be attracted to.


Knowing that beautiful things are highly attractive, in creating this ideal city Socrates must pay close attention to the people who have and cherish luxurious things. In previous conversations, Socrates and Glaucon have discussed the guardians of the city and where they stand in the social workings of the established society. It is established that the guardians will live in common; they will share housing, food, women, and property – in essence, they won’t be able to claim anything as their own (416d3-e). According to Socrates, this lack of ownership will prompt the guardians into believing in “the good of the city,” that is to say, their personal happiness will be sacrificed for the city’s happiness (420b1-4.) Socrates explains to Glaucon that this sacrifice for the city’s happiness is absolutely necessary, simply because the guardians must never experience the beautiful things. He draws a comparison saying that when a farmer is given “fine robes” and “[we] bid them work the earth at their pleasure,” they become less of a farmer (420d6-e.) Since they have now seen and have a slight understanding of beautiful things, they will want to have and experience them forever, meaning they could not live a farmer’s life. The same would happen with a guardian if he experienced beautiful things. In having his own property, the guardian would assume an “owner’s attitude,” and constantly be trying to attain more for himself instead of working to bring more to the city. If the guardian were to shirk his duties in working for the city, then the city and its inhabitants would be served a great injustice. If there are no guardians, then there is no law and order. If there is no law and order, then peace and prosperity would be non-existent in the city. If there is no peace and prosperity, then the city is pointless and the peoples’ lives have no merit. Socrates is making his primary point to Glaucon: when beauty within a city becomes the focus of the inhabitants and their daily existence, then justice is overlooked and suffers in practice.

Glaucon is aiming to rule this ideal city. He is tempted with the thought of being a tyrant leader and Socrates’ main task is to persuade him against this. In order to do this, Socrates has to convince Glaucon of the hideous nature of natural beauty. Socrates begins to discuss the difference between “lovers of sight” and “[who] alone one could rightly call philosophers,” (476b2.) He argues that the lovers of sight find happiness in the beautiful things, but are unable to grasp the actual “nature of the fair itself,” (476b5.) They experience beauty on a surface level, whereas philosophers, those who know the things of the world, are “able to approach the fair itself and see it by itself,” (476b8-9.) Socrates goes further, saying the men who merely see the beautiful are dreaming – they are confusing likenesses of beauty to actual beauty –and their reality of beautiful things is distorted. Inadvertently, Socrates is accusing Glaucon of being a “dreamer.” Glaucon knows he is not a philosopher and therefore lacks the ability to truly understand the nature of beauty. If he cannot grasp the concepts of beauty, then the beautiful things must be purged within his city. This purging is a return to the city of necessity – a city in possession of justice – initially presented by Socrates.

Throughout the work, justice and beauty are often presented side by side. One is rarely shared without the other surfacing in some way. Because Glaucon is drawn to beautiful things, which would pull him away from advocating and participating in justice, Socrates’ primary task is to convince him of the ambiguous nature of beauty. The essential argument against beauty within the city comes forth in the presentation of opinions of man versus the actual knowledge of man. Socrates says, “Knowledge is presumably dependent on what is…” (478a6.) That is to say, the things that are known are definite – they are precise in their being. He goes further, saying “To that which is not we were compelled to assign ignorance…” (478b15.) Specifically, things that are unknown have no absolute in their being. So, drawing a conclusion from these two points, opinion is the cross between knowledge and ignorance (478d2.) To make the official reference and comparison to beauty, Socrates says, “…of these many fair things…is there any that won’t also look ugly?”(479a6.) Where something is beautiful to one person, it could be considered ugly by another. That is to say, there is no common standard for beauty – there is no definitive reference as to what could be considered beautiful; beauty is, in essence, a cross between what is and what is not. The old adage “beauty is in the eye of the beholder” proves meritorious in this argument.

Socrates’ main point is to say that there is no standard for beauty – that a man’s opinion determines what is beautiful. Therefore, if there’s no common reference for beauty, then beauty within the city would be different for each person. Where the farmer finds a new plow a glorious luxury, a ruler would see it as a simple, normal tool for his mundane job. The “beautiful and luxurious city” would be filled with double standards; man would consider only his opinion in determining things and personal happiness would take precedence over the overall happiness of the city. Socrates can only explain justice while defining beauty, and he can only examine the truths of beauty when drawing in justice. He must convince Glaucon, quite simply, that when beauty is the focus, the ambiguous nature of the many beautiful things confuses the ultimate quality needed within the city, justice.

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